135 lines
5.3 KiB
Django/Jinja
135 lines
5.3 KiB
Django/Jinja
# {{ ansible_managed }}
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# see: https://unix.stackexchange.com/a/617194
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# see: https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/617091/can-you-specify-a-different-configuration-for-different-interfaces-in-unbound
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# see: https://www.dnsleaktest.com
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server:
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verbosity: 0
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# listening port
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port: {{ unbound_port }}
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# Allow binding to IP addresses that don't exist yet (e.g., WireGuard at boot)
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ip-freebind: yes
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# Define interface binds by IP address
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interface: 127.0.0.1 # lo (IPv4)
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interface: ::1 # lo (IPv6)
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{% for iface in unbound_interfaces %}
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interface: {{ iface.address }} # {{ iface.comment | default('') }}
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{% endfor %}
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# Define access controls (note that ufw might be also configured)
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access-control: 0.0.0.0/0 refuse
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access-control: 127.0.0.0/8 allow # lo interface
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{% for acl in unbound_access_control %}
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access-control: {{ acl.subnet }} {{ acl.action }} # {{ acl.comment | default('') }}
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{% endfor %}
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access-control: ::0/0 refuse
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access-control: ::1 allow
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# Specify custom local answers for each interface by using views:
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{% for acl in unbound_access_control %}
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{% if acl.view is defined %}
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access-control-view: {{ acl.subnet }} {{ acl.view }}
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{% endif %}
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{% endfor %}
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do-ip4: yes
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do-udp: yes
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do-tcp: yes
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do-ip6: yes
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# You want to leave this to no unless you have *native* IPv6. With 6to4 and
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# Terredo tunnels your web browser should favor IPv4 for the same reasons
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prefer-ip6: no
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# Use this only when you downloaded the list of primary root servers!
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# If you use the default dns-root-data package, unbound will find it automatically
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root-hints: "{{ unbound_root_hints_path }}"
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# enable to not answer id.server and hostname.bind queries.
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hide-identity: yes
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# enable to not answer version.server and version.bind queries.
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hide-version: yes
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# Trust glue only if it is within the server's authority
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harden-glue: yes
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# Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the zone becomes BOGUS
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harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
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# Don't use Capitalization randomization as it known to cause DNSSEC issues sometimes
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# see https://discourse.pi-hole.net/t/unbound-stubby-or-dnscrypt-proxy/9378 for further details
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use-caps-for-id: no
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# the time to live (TTL) value lower bound, in seconds. Default 0.
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# Setting to 0 respects upstream TTLs, avoiding outages on fast-flux services.
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cache-min-ttl: 0
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# the time to live (TTL) value cap for RRsets and messages in the
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# cache. Items are not cached for longer. In seconds.
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cache-max-ttl: 86400
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# Serve expired records while fetching fresh ones in the background.
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# Improves reliability when upstream resolvers are temporarily unavailable.
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serve-expired: yes
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serve-expired-ttl: 86400
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serve-expired-client-timeout: 0
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# Reduce EDNS reassembly buffer size.
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# IP fragmentation is unreliable on the Internet today, and can cause
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# transmission failures when large DNS messages are sent via UDP. Even
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# when fragmentation does work, it may not be secure; it is theoretically
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# possible to spoof parts of a fragmented DNS message, without easy
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# detection at the receiving end. Recently, there was an excellent study
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# >>> Defragmenting DNS - Determining the optimal maximum UDP response size for DNS <<<
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# by Axel Koolhaas, and Tjeerd Slokker (https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/36/contributions/776/)
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# in collaboration with NLnet Labs explored DNS using real world data from the
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# the RIPE Atlas probes and the researchers suggested different values for
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# IPv4 and IPv6 and in different scenarios. They advise that servers should
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# be configured to limit DNS messages sent over UDP to a size that will not
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# trigger fragmentation on typical network links. DNS servers can switch
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# from UDP to TCP when a DNS response is too big to fit in this limited
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# buffer size. This value has also been suggested in DNS Flag Day 2020.
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edns-buffer-size: 1232
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# Perform prefetching of close to expired message cache entries
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# This only applies to domains that have been frequently queried
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# NOTE: Disabled because prefetch doesn't work with subnet module (views)
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# see: https://unbound.docs.nlnetlabs.nl/en/latest/manpages/unbound.conf.html#unbound-conf-prefetch
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prefetch: no
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# Threads and cache slabs optimized for 4-core CPU
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num-threads: 4
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msg-cache-slabs: 4
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rrset-cache-slabs: 4
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infra-cache-slabs: 4
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key-cache-slabs: 4
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# Cache sizes optimized for 64GB RAM
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msg-cache-size: 512m
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rrset-cache-size: 1g
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# Ensure kernel buffer is large enough to not lose messages in traffic spikes
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so-rcvbuf: 4m
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so-sndbuf: 4m
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# Ensure privacy of local IP ranges
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private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
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private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
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private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
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private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
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private-address: fd00::/8
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private-address: fe80::/10
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# Allow the domain (and its subdomains) to contain private addresses.
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# local-data statements are allowed to contain private addresses too.
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private-domain: "{{ unbound_custom_lan_domain }}"
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# Enable DNSSEC
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auto-trust-anchor-file: "{{ unbound_anchor_root_key }}"
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include: "{{ unbound_custom_lan_config_path }}"
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include: "{{ unbound_custom_vpn_config_path }}"
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